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Labor markets are assumed, in orthodox stabilization  programs,
to be flexible. The experience in Zambia proved this assumption
unfounded.
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Conventional  stabilisation  and  adjustment  policies  for  developing
countries  typically  presuppose  the  existence  of labour  market  flexibility.
Variation  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  usually  given  a central  place  in
such  reforms  because  it  can  change  the  structure  of relative  prices  in
virtuous  ways.  In the  presence  of labour  market  rigidity,  however,  such
price  changes  will  not  be achieved.  If,  for  example,  real  wages  were
inflexible  downwards,  reduction  of the  nominal  exchange  rate  would  have
scarcely  any real  effects: except  during  a short  transitional  period,
relative  prices  would  remain  unchanged  and  resource  reallocation  would  not
occur.
Inflexibility  of the  labour  market  can  also  explain  a lack  of output
response  even  where  relative  prices  have  been  successfully  altered.  Low
supply  elasticities  often  arise  from  a lack  of available  physical  inputs  - raw
materials,  equipment,  intermediate  goods  - but they  can  also  be caused  by
shortages  of or qualitative  deficiencies  in  human  resources,  by ignorance  of
technological  possibilities  or of  market  opportunities.
These  facts  are  demonstrated  in this  paper,  which  examines  the  relationship
between  successive  attempts  to stabilise  the  economy  of Zambia  and  trends  in
its  domestic  labour  market.  It is shown  that  both skill  shortages  and  real
wage rigidity  exacerbated  Zambia's  economic  decline  over  more than  a decade,
notwithstanding  successive  nominal  devaluations  of the  Kwacha.  Furthermore
it is shown  that  the  early  demise,  in 1987,  of the  adjustment  package  imposed
by the  IMP  resulted  from  an  unrealistic  (or  unconsidered)  assumption  that  the
majority  of  middle  and  lower  income  urban  Zambians  would  tolerate
pauperisation  at the  hands  of  a rapidly  depreciating  nominal  exchange  rate,
notwithstanding  the  lessons  and  history  of the  previous  decade.  It follows
that serious  analysis  of the  labour  market  is  a  necessary  input  to (and  the
major  past  omission  from)  the  design  of stabilisation  and  adjustment
programmes  if  they  are  to stand  much  chance  of either  economic  or  political
success.
The  analysis  begins  with  a short  account  of Zambia's  macroeconomic
record  since  1970.  This  is  followed  by an assessment  of some  of the  main
influences  on and  characteristics  of labour  supply  and  labour  demand  over  the
period.  The  central  section  of the  paper  identifies  the  major  labour  market
rigidities  in Zambia  and  their  contribution  to the  country's  economic  decline.
The final  section  examines  the  impact  of the  1985  IMF  stabilisation  package  on
the  labour  market,  and  the  reasons  for  its  ultimate  rejection.  Conclusions
are  drawn  for  future  policy  in  Zambia,  and  for  other  countries  contemplating  -
or  being  urged  to introduce  - economic  reforms.
Economic  Change  in  Zambia  1970-85
In recent  times  there  have  been  few  countries  in the  world  which
have  had  a  more catastrophic  economic  record  than  Zambia. Over  the  two
decades  ei,ding  in 1985,  only  six  countries  - from  amongst  the  120  or so for
which  data  are  available  (World  Bank  1987:  Table  1) - had  a  worse  record  of
income  loss.  Furthermore  in four  of these  six  cases  (Niger,  C-had,  Uganda  and
F,icaragua)  the  occurrence  of  natural  or  political  disasters  in the  form  of
lrought  and/or  war largely  explain  their  demise. 'Easy'  explanations  are-2-
absent  in Zambia's  case. Its  recent  economic  history  therefore  has some
important,  and  unusual  phenomena  to  explain.
As argued  elsewhere,  the  major  causes  of Zambia's  economic  decline
lie  in the  interaction  between  the  prolonged  fall  in  export  prices,  and  the
particular  ways in  which  the  Zambian  Government  (GRZ)  reacted  to the  payments
deficits  which  this  price  trend  caused  (Colclough  1988). There  were,
nevertheless,  aspects  of the  evolution  of the  labour-market  in Zambia  which
prompted  (or  prevented  the  alleviation  of)  Zambia's  difficulties.  Table  1
summarises  important  aspects  of recent  economic  change. During  the  early
19709  output  growth  was steady. But,  at about  4  per  cent  per  year,  it  was
more  modest  than  during  the  heady  expansion  of the  immediate  post-independence
years. In 1975,  howpver,  growth  was arrested. The  first  part  of Table  1
shows  the  performance  of each  of the  main branches  of the  economy  over  the
period,  expressed  in 1970  constant  prices. It  can  be seen  that  agriculture
did  continue  to grow  after  1975,  but,  at around  2 per  cent  per  year,  this  was
not  as fast  as population  growth  (see  below). Thus,  per  capita  agricultural
production  declined  over  the  period. The  picture  in other  sectors  appears  to
have  been  even  worse,  with the  output  of  mining,  industry  and services  each
remaining  roughly  unchanged,  or falling  slightly  over  the  following  decade.
The  immediate  reasons  for  this  lie  in  the  performance  of the  mining
sector. These  reasons  are  somewqhat  hidden  by the  constant  price  production
series  for  mining  shown  in the  table. Since  that  is  basically  a  volume  index
- converting  quantities  to  values  on the  basis  of  prices  obtaining  in 1970  -
it  hides  any  value  losses,  or gains,  accraing  to Zambia  over  the  period  as a
result  of changes  in  the  real  international  price  of its  main  export
commodity,  copper. Such  price  changes  have,  in fact,  been substantial.  Most
notably  this  was so in  1975,  when  the  price  of copper  on the  international
market  fell  by almost  50  per  cent. At that  time  the  value  of copper  exports
represented  about  half  of Zambia's  GDP,  and  over  90  per cent  of exports  in
value  terms. Tl  is,  the  price  fall  had  an immediate,  and  massive,  effect  upon
Zambia's  current  income. Table  1 shows  that  the  terms-of-trade  loss  in 1975
amounted  to  more than  one  quarter  of GDP  in comparison  with  prices  obtaining
in 1970. The  whole  of this  loss  arose  from  the  collapse  of the  copper  price.
The  most immediate  impact  of these  disastrous  events  was felt  on the
balance  of  payments. From  a fairly  comfortable  position  in 1974,  both  current
and  capital  accounts  swung  sharply  into  deficit  the  following  year.  That  on
current  account  amounted  to  approximately  30 per  cent  of GDP.  There  were few
alternatives  to financing  the  deficit  by Zambia  increasing  its  iiaternational
borrowing  and  by running  down  its  reserves  of foreign  exchange. The latter
were sufficient  to  cover  only  about  10  per  cent  of the  deficit  on current
account. Accordingly  there  was  heavy  recourse  to  borrowing  as  a short-term
response. This,  of course,  carried  the  implication  of  higher  debt-service
commitments  over  the  longer  term,  which  could  be  met  only  if the  external
earnings/expenditure  imbalance  were to  be quickly  corrected.Table  1:  Gross  Doestic Product  and Income  (total  and  per  capita),  by Type  of  Acanomic  ActivitY
(millions  of constant  1970  Kwacha)
1970  1974  1975  1980  1983  1984  1985
Agriculture  136.1  150.5  157.0  166.4  172.3  181.9  198.7
Mining  460.3  474.3  427.9  398.7  446.5  402.8  381.4
Industry  235.0  339.4  34r.0  326.8  346.7  349.7  366.4
Other  437.1  509.7  508.2  525.9  506.9  500.8  513.0
GDP (market  prices)  1268.5  1473.9  1438.1  1417.8  1472.4  1435.2  1459.5
Plus  T/T adjustment(a) - -104.7  -387.2  -367.3  -427.1  -350.0  -360.0
GDY(b)  1268.5  1369.2  1049.9  1050.5  1045.3  1085.2  1099.5
Population  (000's)  4159  4700  4846  5647  6285  6500  6725
GDP  per  capita  (K)  305  314  297  251  200  191  190
GDY  per capita  (K)  305  291  217  186  166  167  163
Notes:  aRough  estimates  for 1984  and 1985
bGross  domestic  income:  this  is  equal  to  GDP  plus adjustment  for  variations  in
the  terms  of trade.
Sources: Calculated  on the  basis  of data  in  World  Bank  1984,  Tables  2.02  and  2.04  and
World  Bank,  1986,  Tables  2.02  and  2.04.a  4 -
A  range  of policies  were  utilised  by the  Zambian  Government  in its
atte=pts  to achieve  such  a correction.  Gross  domestic  expenditure  fell  by 18
per  cent in  1976.  Th's  was necessary  if  more  domestically  produced  goods  were
to  be released  for  export,  or,  alternatively  if imports  were to fall.  However,
owing  to the  structure  of the  economy,  export  growth  required  substantial
product  diversification,  rather  than  mere  contraction  of domestic  dem'rd.  Thus
the  main impact  of the  latter  was felt  on the  side  of imports  which  fell  by
one  quarter,  in  real  terms,  in 1976. The  composition  of the  expenditure
reduction,  however,  gave  additional  cause  for  concern.  Almost  the  entire  brunt
of the  fall  in spending  -das  concentrated  on investment  expenditure,  whilst
consumption  continued  to rise  in  absolute  (though  not in  per  capita)  terms.
This  pattern  was sustained  during  the  following  several  years,  which
drastically  reduced  the  possibility  of a return  to economic  growth,  even  fromi
the  depressed  levels  of the  mid 1970's.
Spending  by the  Government  was also  cut  back  sharply.  Here  again,
however,  the  burden  of the  cuts  was focussed  upon  the  capital,  rather  than  the
recurrent  budget.  Capital  spending  fell  by 70  per  cent  over the  eight  years
ending  in 1983.  In spite  of this  the  public  sector  deficit  continued  to amount
to  approximately  one-third  of total  spending.  This  was  partly  financed  by
borrowing  from  the  central  bank,  and  partly  by foreign  borrowing,  both  of
which tended  to aggravate  the  size  of the  external  payments  deficit.
As regards  policies  focused  directly  upon  the  external  sector,
protection  was sharpened  by the  introduction  of an elaborate  system  of import
licensing  and  of foreign  exchange  allocation.  As has  been found  in  many other
country  contexts,  however,  this  system  of controls  was administered  often
inefficiently,  and  sometimes  corruptly.It  certainly  served  to reduce  the  level
of expenditure  on imports,  but  it  did  so in  ways  that  further  undermined  the
productivity  of the  domestic  economy,owing  to the  shortages  and  delays  which
it  helped  to generate.
The  exchange  rate  was gradually  depreciated  after  1975.  By 1982  it
had fallen  to approximately  two-thirds  of its  level  in the  mid-1970's.  The
pace  of domestic  inflation,  however,  was faster  than  in Zambia's  main trading
partners  and,  in spite  of  nominal  adjustments,  the  currency  in fact  became
increasingly  overvalued.  The  prevailing  price  incentives,  therefore,  tended  to
decrease  the  profitability  of  export  or import-substitute  production  over  the
period. Iu  response  to  the  high,  and rising  inflation  rate,  the  Government
increased  the  administrative  regulation  of consumer  prices,  and  extended  the
range  and  extent  of subsidies  on  basic  commodities.  Although  this  protected
consumers,  it further  reduced  the  profitability  of domestic  industry.
The  consequence  of the  above  range  of  domestic  policies  wan that  the
economy  continued  to stagnate  over  the  period  1976-1983.  By the  early  1980's,
capacity  utilisation  in  manufacturing  had  dropped  to as little  as 30 per  cent,
whilst  transport  and  marketing  bottlenecks  prevented  the  effective
distribution  of those  commodities  that  were available.  Continued
over-valuation  of the  exchange  rate  provided  few  incentives  for
diversification.  Although  imports  were  held  back,  the  sustained  decline  of
the  copper  price  implied  a continued  reduction  in  real  export  revenues,  and,
therefore,  in the  capacity  to import. The rising  price  of oil  exacerbated  thedifficulties.  The  real  value  of exports  (adjusted  for  changep  in import
prices)  was  halved  between  1974  and  1975  - but  it  was  hdlved  again  by 1983.
The impact  of these  trends  is shown  ir.  Table  1: domestic  income  remained
stagnant  between  1975  and  1985,  and  by the  latter  year,  income  per  head  had
fallen  to a level  which  was scarcely  mr.a  than  half that  of 1970. Meanwhile,
current  account  deficits  continued,  vh!ch  were financed  by borrowing.  Both
loans  and  attendant  debt  service  grew  sharply,  and  by 1983  the latter  was
equivalent  to  more  than  half of export  earnings,  exclusive  of arrears  equal  to
about  two  years  of current  debt  service  payments.  An already  disastrous
situation  thus  became  untenable. A major  injection  of external  resources  was
needed,  which  would  be forthcoming  from  the  country's  main donors  only in
return  for  a sharp  change  in  the  direction  of  domestic  policy.  Such  changes
were, in  fact,  introduced,  following  extensive  negotiations  with the  IMF.  The
most fundamental  of these  came  in late  1985.  Their  centrepiece  was the
introduction  of a  weekly  auction  of foreign  exchange,  which  engendered  a
massive  fall  in  the  value  of the  Kwacha  and  a sharp  readjustment  to the  whole
structure  of relative  prices.  Nevertheless,  the  reforms  proved  to be
short-lived. A  later  section  of this  paper  examines  the  reasons  for  this,
together  with the impact  of these  recent  events  upon  the  labour  market.
Aspects  of Labour  Supply
Population  Growth  and  Age-Sex  Composition:  Against  this  gloomy
background  of economic  decline  there  have  been  important  changes  in the
characteristics  of the  labour  force  over  the  past  two  decades. The  population
had,  by 1987,  more  than  doubled  since  1963. Table  2  provides  estimates  to
1980.  It shows  that  its  rate  of growth  has itself  increased  sharply  over  the
period  - from  2.5  per  cent  per  year  in the  early  years  of independence,  to 3.3
per cent  over  the  period  1974-80. One  of the  major  consequences  of the
acceleration  in  the  rate  of  population  growth  is  a change  in its  age
structure. On the  one  hand it is  becoming  more  youthful: the  proportion  of
the  population  under  15 years  increased  from  46 to  almost  50  per cent  between
1969  and  1980 (Table  3),  whilst  the  proportion  in  the  working  age  group
decreased. At the  same  time,  because  of  declining  mortality  rates  the
proportion  of elderly  people  increased  over  the  period. Table  3 shows  that
similar  trends  in the  age  structure  have  occurred  for  both  sexes  - although  if
anything  the  decline  in the  proportion  of  males  in  the  working  age-group  has
been sharper  than  that  for  females.
These  trends  have  had  a  number  of important  consequences.  First,
even if individual  fertility  declines,  birth  rates  will remain  high for  a
considerable  number  of  years  by consequence  of the  age  structure. Second,  the
number  of new  entrants  to the  labour  force  will  continue  to increase  sharply
well into  the  next  century. Third,  the  decline  in  the  proportion  of people  ir.
the  working  age-group  implies  an increase  in  the  dependency  ratio,  with
consequent  needs  for  proportionately  higher  health  and  education  expenditures,
as  well as  heavier  demands  on the  household  budget,  at a time  when the  economy
has  been in  sharp  decline. The interaction  of these  trends  has  undoubtedly
resulted  in  extreme  hardship  being  experienced  by a large  number  of
individuals  and  families.Table  2:  Pulation  Growth  and  its  Distribution,  1963-1980
Average  Annual  Growth  (%)
1963  1969  1974  1980  63-69  69-74  69-80
Total  Rural  2774484  2864879  3014000  3239389  0.5  1.0  1.1
Total  Urban  715020  1192116  1663000  2440419  8.9  6.9  6.7
of  which  - Lusaka  123146  262425  401000  538469  13.4  8.9  6.8  0
Kitwe  123027  199798  251000  314794  8.4  4.6  4.2
Ndola  92691  159786  229000  282439  9.5  7.4  5.3
Total  Zambia  3490170  4056995  4677000  5679808  2.5  2.9  3.1
Percentage  Urban  (%)  20.5  29.4  35.6  43.0
Sources:  Population  Census  Results  from  each  of the  years  shown7
Table  3:  Poulation bY Sex  and  Ace  Grou.  1969  and 1980  (tercentaaes)
Age  Group  Male  Female  Total
1969  1980  1969  1980  1969  1980
Under  15 years  47.5  50.7  45.6  48.7  46.4  49.8
15-44  years  37.9  36.3  42.9  40.0  40.5  38.3
45-64  years  12.1  9.6  9.5  8.7  10.8  9.1
65+  years  2.5  3.3  2.0  2.6  2.3  2.8
Source: GRZ 1980a,  Table  2.3- a  -
Internal  Migrationt The  physical  location  of the  population  has
also  changed  markedly. Analysis  of the  two  most recent  census  results  shows
that  rural-rural  migration,  primarily  within  provinces  outside  the  line  of
rail,  has  been  numerically  the  most  important  type  of  population  movement.
Nevertheless,  rural-urban  migration  has remained  very important  - albeit  with
important  shifts  in  volume  over  the  years  since  independence.  Urbaniqstion
has  been  extremely  rapid,  such  that  by the  mid  19808  Zambia  was  the  most
urbanised  country  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  (exluding  South  Africa),  with almost
half  of the  population  living  in  urban  areas  by that  time (World  Bank  1987,
Table  33). The  movement  to  the  towns  was greatest  in  the  early
post-independence  years. Table  2 shows  that  urban  growth  of 9  per  cent  per
year  in the  19608,  slowed  to  about  7  per  cent  by the  early  1970s. Further
reductions  in the  annual  rate  of growth  to around  five  per cent,  appear  to
have  occurred. Although  the  most  recent  disaggregated  data  are  for  1980,  ^
is  probable  that  urban  growth  slowed  sharply  after  that  date  as  a result  of
the increased  economic  hardships  associated  with  urban  living. Data for  the
three  largest  towns  are  shown  in  Table  2.  Their  growth  was  particularly
marked  until  1974.  Subsequently,  the  growth  of the  two  copper-belt  towns  of
Kitwe  and  Ndola  fell  beb id  that  of other  urban  centres. The  capital  city,
Lusaka,  however,  continu*i  to Srow  rapidly,  at least  until  1980,  - albeit  at a
somewhat  slower  pace  than  during  t..e  first  independence  decade. There  has,
therefore,  been  a redirection  of  migration  away  from  the  Copperbelt  - which
was initially  worst  hit  by the  recession  of the  late  19709  - towards  the
capital. Net-migration  to  the  Copperbelt  fell  in  relative  terms  by almost  50
per  cent  between  1969  and  1980,  whilst  that  to  Lusaka  changed  little  over  the
period. Already  by 1980  there  wes evidence  of increased  return  flows  of
migrants  from  the  Copperbelt  to  Northern  and  Luapula  provinces. Such
out-migration  from  the  urban  areas  most  affected  by  economic  decline  will
almost  certainly  have further  increased  over  the  past few  years.
Schooling: The  provision  of schooling  for  Zambians  has increased
enormously  since  independence.  Access  at  primary  level  has  quadrupled,  such
that  by 1984  more than  1.2  million  children  were in  primary  school. Secondary
school  places  had increased  ten-fold  to 125000  by the  same  year,  and
university  and  technical  college  enrolments  had  increased  likewise  to
approximately  10000  students. Even  such  rapid  expansion  of schooling  as this,
however,  takes  many  years  to change  the  educational  profile  of the  population
significantly  - particularly  in  the  context  of Zambia's  high rate  of
population  growth. Thus,  the  population  census  of 1980  revealed  that  almost
half  of the  population  aged  15  years  and  above  had  not  completed  lower  primary
schooling,  and  were thus  probably  still  illiterate.  Moveover,  only  10  per
cent  had  had  some  post  primary  schooling,  wi-ih  tiny  proportions  having
proceded  to the  tertiary  level. These  fact  ,elp  to explain  the  continued
skill  shortages  which,  as  will  be shown  below,  represent  an important
constraint  upon Zambia's  social  and  economic  development.
Participation  in the  Labour  Force: Somewhat  unusually,  the  1980
census  defined  the  labour  force  to  include  all  persons  aged  12  years  or  more.
They  comprised  3.3  million  persons. Of those,  just  over  half (1.7  millions)
were regarded  as being  economically  active,  with the  remainder  being  students,
housewives,  retired  or disabled  persons,  etc. Using  these  conventions,  71  per
cent  of the  male labour  force  was recorded  as  being  economically  active,  with-9-
only  37  per  cent  of  the  females  being  so  classified.  For  the  usual  reasons
these  estimates  result  in  a  significant  understatement  of  the  amount of
productive  work  undertak  %  by women.  Half  of  the  working  population  were
engaged  in  agricultural  work  (two-thirds  of  the  females  and  about  44 per  cent
of  the  males).  One third  were  self-employed  and  a  further  5  per  cent  (but  12
per  cent  of  the  females)  were  unpaid  family  workers  - again,  preponderantly  in
the  agricultural  sector.
Aspects  of  Labour  Demand
Data  on  the  number of  employees  in  the  formal  sector  are  shown in
Table  4.  As is  to  be  expected  from what  has  been  said  earlier,  experiences  in
the  labour  market  bafore  and  after  1975 were  very  different.  The first  decade
of  independence  was  characterised  by  steady  growth  of  formal  employment at
about  4 per  cent  per  year,  such  that,  by  1975,  approximately  50 per  cent  more
workers  were  employed  than  had  been  the  case  at  independence.  Subsequently,
however,  employment  fell  back,  declining,  on  average,  by  about  one  per  cent
per  year  to  1984.
This  circumstance  of  absolute  decline  in  formal  employment over  the
decade  beginning  in  1975 is  the  most  fundamental  feature  of  ZaMbia's  recent
labour  market  history.  Its  effects  have  been  momentous.  The proportion  of
the  labour  force  employed  in  the  formal  sector  has  fallen  by  one  third  since
1975.  An even  more  startling  implication  is  that  whereas  one  in  thirtieen
Zambians  had  a  job  in  the  formal  sector  in  1975,  ten  years  later  only
approximately  one  in  18 persons  had  such  a  job.  Thus,  the  number of  persons
without  access  to  any  (direct  or  indirect)  support  from wage or  salary  incomes
is  now vastly  greater  than  it  was  in  the  early  1970s.
The  structure  of  formal  employment by  industry  is  indicated  in  Table
5.  A number of  important  features  emerge  from  this  table.  First,  job  losses
after  1975 were  heavily  concentrated  in  the  construction  industry,  which  io3t
more than  half  of  its  jobs  by  1984.  The primary  cause  of  this  concentration
was  the  massive  fall  in  investment  expenditures,  which  resulted  from  the
curtailment  of  domestic  expenditures  in  response  to  the  country's  growing
payments  deficit.  Second,  employment also  fell  in  mining  and  quarrying,
particularly  after  1980,  in  response  to  the  sharply  curtailed  profitability  of
the  copper  industry.  Thirdly,  apart  from agriculture,  which  stagnated  over
the  period,  employment  elsewhere  actually  rose:  in  manufacturing  and  transport
by  about  10 per  cent,  and  in  services,  by  about  7 per  cent  to  1984  (but  by
somewhat more to  1980).  More detailed  analysis  of  the  data  for  services
reveals  that  the  rise  to  1980 was  almost  entirely  due  to  expansion  o.
employment  in  the  public  sector,  which  could  not  be  sustained,  for  fiziancial
reasons,  beyond  that  date.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  true  that  the  most  severe
employment problems  were  contained  in  a  rather  narrow  industrial  range:
outside  mining  and  construction  job  losses  were  not  so  severe.
This  Lonclusion  is  strengthened  if  one  considers  only  Zambian
employees.  Rapid  progress  with  localisation  was  achieved  after  1975  - that
is,  an  increasing  number of  Zambians  took  over  jobs  previously  held  by
expatriates.  Thus,  whilst  the  total  job  losses  between  1975 and  1984 amounted
to  about  30,000,  almost  20,000  expatriate  workers  appeared  to  have  been10
Table 4:  Emlovees  in  the Formal  Sector  by Citizenship,  June 1964-1984  (a)
Total  Employees  Zambians  Non  Zambians Non Zambians
as %  of Total
1964  264,100  232,000  32,100  12.2
1965  301,600  267,760  33,840  11.2
1966  313,360  284,480  28,880  9.2
1967  303,730  274,650  29,080  9.6
1968  319,730  290,8'J0  28,930  9.0
1969  321,460  291,640  29,820  9.3
1970  337,750  310,320  27,430  8.1
1971  358,350  331,670  26,680  7.4
1972  364,740  338,750  25,990  7.1
1973  377,640  342,990  34,650  9.2
1974  386,270  351,190  35,080  9.1
1975  398,840  365,330  33,510  8.4
1976  379,400  346,310  33,090  8.7
1977  372,630  345,320  27,310  7.3
1978  369,310  344,480  24,830  6.7
1979  371,670  348,290  23,380  6.3
1980  381,490  360,980  20,510  5.4
1981  373,720  355,220  18,500  5.0
1982  367,510  350,050  17,460  4.8
1983  363,800  348,270  25,530  4.3
1984  365,190  351,190  14,020  3.8
Notes:  Prior  to  1972,  data  are  available  for  Africans  and  non-Africans  on:y.
These  are  shown  in  the  relevant  citizenship  columns.  Data  for  198;-84
are  preliminary  estimates.
Source:  GRZ  1985,  Table  6.- 11  -
localised  over  that  period. Thus,  Zambian  employment  fell  by the  somewhat
lower  figure  of 10,000  workers  over  those  nine  years  (Table  5).
The  relationships  between  output  and  employment  growth  are
investigated  in  more  detail  in Table  6.  Employment/output  elasticities  are
shown  for  the  1970-75  and  1970-80  periods. These  estimates  are rough,  in the
sense  that  they  take  no ar.count  of  changes  in real  and  relative  factor  prices
over  the  period. In  addition,  in a  number  of sectors  the  elasticities  are  not
shown,  owing  to the  occurrence  of a  negative  value  for  one  of the  relevant
variables. Nevertheless,  for  the  economy  as a  whole  the  data  suggest  that  the
aggregate  relationship  between  employment  and  output  growth  has  been  close  to
unit;. This implies  that  in the  aggregate,  no labour  productivity  growth
occurred  over  the  19708. This  unusual  result  can  be explained  in a  number  of
ways.  First  the  elasticities  shown  are  heavil'y  influenced  by  movements  in  the
services  sector,  which  itself  is  dominated  by the  public  service. Since,
here,  output  increases  are  basically  determined  by increases  in the  real  wages
and  salaries  paid,  output  and  employment  can  usually  be expected  to  move
upwards  or downwards  at similar  rates,  in  the  absence  of significant  changes
in  the  real  value  of average  earnings. Second,  circumstances  of  negative
growth  of output  and  employment  are  not conducive  to  the  measurement  of
meaningful  elasticities.  For  example,  there  are  likely  to  be strong  political
and institutional  reasons  for  laying  off  workers  less  quickly  than  may  be
thought  justifiable  on profitability  grounds. Thus,  the  ensuing  fall  in
average  labour  productivity  will tend  to raise  the  size  of  measured
employment/output  elasticities  during  times  of recession.  At the  least,  some
adjustment  lag  is to  be expected  in the  labour  market,  which  partly  explains
the  relationships  between  output  and  employment  indicated  by Table  6.
Labour  Market  Rigidities
An important  question  which  arises  is  whether  or not  conditions  in
the  labour  market  exacerbated  the  economic  decline. Although  cause  and  effect
are  not  easy  to disentangle,  it  does  seem  that  there  were some  structural
characteristics  prominent  in Zambia  which  made  adjustment  to  the  new  economic
circumstances  more,  rather  than less  difficult  to  achieve.
Skill  Shortages.  The  first  of these  concerns  the  skill-structure
of the  labour  force. Shortages  of skilled  and  educated  workers  have always
comprised  a  major  problem  for  the  country's  development.  During  the  colonial
period  African  education  had  not  been  given  high  priority. In spite  of the
comparative  wealth  of Northern  Rhodesia,  during  most  years  far  more  money  was
spent  upon  the  education  of European  children  than  upon  all forms  of education
for  the  remaining  97  per  cent  of the  population.  In  addition,  racial
discrimination  in both  the  public  service  and  the  private  sector  was often
explicit  (for  example,  until  1959,  legislation  prevented  Africans  from  being
taken  on  as apprentices).  Thus,  the  training  and  experience  necessary  for
advancement  was often  not  available  to the  African  population.  By consequence
Zambia  started  out  with a  major  deficit  of professional  and  industrial  skills,
which  was to  prove  very  difficult  to remove.
Table  7 indicates  the  changes  in  the  educational  structure  of the
formal  sector  Zambian  labour  force  that  have  subsequently  oc.urred. The12
Table  5: Employees  in  the  Formal  Sector.  1965-84,  by Citizenship
and Economic  Sectork 81
1965  1970  1975  1980  1984
Agriculture,Forestry,Fishing 32700  34610  36100  32630  35400
Zambian  32070  34090  3479n  31580  34660
Non-Zambian  630  520  1310  1050  740
Mining  and  Quarrying  52360  57640  64750  63070  58470
Zambian  44820  52130  54440  57110  54390
Non-Zambian  7540  5510  10310  5960  4080
Manufacturing  27770  38160  44330  47760  48200
Zambian  24030  35230  41230  45860  46720
Non-Zambian  3740  2930  3100  1900  1480
Construction  45320  68740  71750  43750  33610
Zambian  43100  66220  67790  42070  32570
Non-Zambian  2220  2520  3960  1680  1040
Transport  & Communications  14560  22340  22050  23940  24000
Zambian  11870  19720  20490  23040  23340
Non-Zambian  2690  2620  1560  900  660
Services(b)  88350  121480 154510  168150  165510
Zambian  72290  108200 142430  159780 159490
Non-Zambian  16060  13280  12080  8370  6020
TOTAL  261060  342970 393490  379300 365190
Zambian  228180  315580 361170  359440 351170
Non-Zambian  32880  27390  32320  19860  14020
Notes;
a  - Data  are for  fourth  quarter  of each  year  shown,  except  those
for  1965,  which  are  averages  of all  quarters,  and for  1984,
which  are for  June.  Prior  to  1975,  the citizenship  breakdown
refers  to  Africans  and  non-Africans,  rather  than  Zambian/non-
Zambian,  respectively.
b  - Includes  utilities,  financial  and  business  services,
restaurants  and  hotels  and  other  services.
Sources:  GRZ 1980b,  and  Meesook  et al 1986:  Appendix  Table  1.Table  6:  Observed  relationships  between  Outvut  and  Eloyment,  by  Sector.  1970-80
GDP(")  Average  Annual  Average  Annual  Growth  Employment/Output
Growth  of  GDP (%)  of Employment  (%)  Elasticities  la)
1970  1975  1980  1970-75  1970-80  1970-75  1970-80  1970-75  1970-80
Agriculture(h)  41.5  56.3  58.7  6.3  3.5  0.8  -0.5  0.12  -
Mining  460.3  427.9  398.7  -1.4  -1.4  2.4  0.9  - -
Manufacturing  129.2  157.6  162.9  4.1  2.3  3.0  2.3  0.73  1.0
Construction  90.3  138.5  79.1  8.9  -1.3  0.9  -4.4  0.10  -
Transport  48.8  57.6  56.5  3.4  1.5  '  -0.3  0.7  - 0.47
Services  '  403.8  499.5  554.2  4.3  3.2  4.9  3.3  1.14  1.03
TOTAL  1173.9  1337.4  1310.1  2.6  1.1  2.8  1.0  1.08  d.91
Notes:  a)  Millions  of Constant  1970  Kwacha,  market  prices
b) Excluding  subsistence  output  and  employment
c) Includes  import  duties  less  imputed  bank  service  charges
d) Calculated  by dividing  average  annual  growth  of  employment
by that  of  GDP,  for  each  period  and sector
Sources: GDP  data:  CSO,  Konthly  Digest  of Statistics,  various  issues
Employment  data:  Text,  Table  5- 14 -
Hanpower  Survey  which  was  held shortly  after  independence  (GRZ  1966),
documented  in some  detail  the  extent  of the  manpower  constraint  faced  by
Zambia  at that  time. It can  be seen  from  the  Table  that  the  vast  majority  of
the  236,000  Africans  then  employed  had  had  little  or no formal  schooling,  and
that  less  than  one  per  cent  of them  had  had five  years  of secondary  schooling
or  more.  Over the  following  two  decades,  however,  the  educational  expansion
initiated  soon  after  taking  office  by  Kaunda's  United  National  Independence
Party  was to alter  this  educational  profile  sharply. Table  7 shows  that  by
1983  over  20 per  cent  of Zambian  employees  had  at least  'O'  level  (secondary.
Form  5) qualifications,  and  that  about  half  had  had  some  secondary  schooling.
These  were  major  achievements  for  a country  which,  twenty  years  earlier,  had
inherited  a school  system  which  was so  thoroughly  inadequate  in  both
quantitative  and  qualitative  terms.
Nevertheless,  this  progress  fell  far  short  of  meeting  the  needs  of
the  formal  sector  for  the  full  range  of technical  and  professional  skills,  and
a substantial  number  of  non-citizen  skilled  workers  had  to be employed
throughout  the  period.  This  was in  spite  of the  fact  that  rapid  localisation
of the  labour  force  was  assigned  high  political  priority  soon  after
independence.  A fairly  complex  set  of regulations  was  established,  requiring
the  satisfaction  of strict  criteria  before  work  permits  for  expatriate
personnel  could  be issued  by the  Ministry  of  Labour.  Foremost  amongst  these
was the  production  of satisfactory  evidence  by an employer  that  no suitably
qualified  or experienced  Zambian  was  available  for  the  job  in  question.  Under
these  circumstances,  a good  indicator  of the  extent  to  which  skill  shortages
amongst  the  Zambian  labour  force  have  remained  important  is  provided  by trends
in the  employment  of  non-citizens.  Table  4 shows  that  the  total  number  of
non-Zambian  employees  remained  approximately  constant  from  1964-76,  although
their  proportional  importance  declined  from  12  per  cent  to  9 per  cent  of
formal  employment  over  those  years. Thereafter,  however,  the  number  of
expatriate  workers  dro,pped  sharply,  such  that  by 1984  only  14,000  (less  than
half the  earlie)  levels)  remained,  accounting  for  less  than  4 per  cent  of
formal  employment.
This  aggregate  picture  of good  progress  with localisation  is,
however,  misleading  in  a number  of  ways.  First,  in  one important  sense,  the
'gap'  is  even  smaller  than  it appears  in Table  4, in that  approximately  half
of the  non-citizens  currently  employed  are  Zambian  residents,  mainly
originating  from  other  African  countries,  who, from  a labour  market  viewpoint,
can  be treated  as  being  equivalent  to citizens  since  they  are  unlikely  to face
official  pressures  to leave.3 On the  other  hand,  in  a different  sense,  the
progress  with localisation  has  been  less  satisfactory  than  the  table  appears
to indicate:  although  large  numbers  of  non-citizens  left  Zambia  after  1975,
not  all  of those  workers  were replaced  by adequately  qualified  and  experienced
Zambians. Many of their  jobs  remained  vacant.  This  was  particularly  so  for
those  expatriates  who vacated  professional  and  technical  jobs  after  1985  and
who left  the  country  primarily  because  they  faced  declining  real  incomes  in
the  face  of the  Kwacha  devaluations  which  occurred.  By 1987,  the  situation  in
the  health  sector  was particularly  serious,  with large  numbers  of foreign
doctors  having  left  Zambia,  without  replacement  by either  Zambian  or
expatriate  personnel  (see  below). In addition,  the  aggregate  quantitative
picture  hid  qualitative  problems  in the  labour  market  which  affected  most1,
Table  7:  Educational  Qualifications  held  by
Zambian  Employees,  1965  and 1983  a)
1965  1983
Number  Number  %
Less  than  Form  II  226681  96.0  189514  54.4
Forms  II/III  7282  3.1  85123  24.4
;0'  Level(b)  1516  0.6  45308  13.0
A' Level(b)/Diploma  517  0.2  17566  5.0
Degree  150  0.1  10759  3.1
TOTAL  236146  100.0  348270  100.0
Note:  a - Data  for 1965  refer  to  Africans,  rather  than
Zambians. Those  for 1983  are  based  upon  a
sample  survey  of employees  along  the line  of
rail,  covering  approximately  70  per cent  of
total  formal  employment. The  percentage
distribution  revealed  by that  survey  has  been
applied  to separate  estimates  for  total
Zambian  employment,  published  by the  CSO.
b - '0'  level  and 'A'  level  are  examinations
typically  taken  after  5 years  and  7 years  of
secondary  schooling,  respectively.
Sources: GRZ 1966,  Table  II.3,  GRZ 1983,  Table  8.0,  and
GRZ 1985,  Table  6.- 16 
sectors  of the  economys  localisation  had  not  always  and  everywhere  been
efficiently  handled. Thus  it is  evident  - particularly  in the  public  and
parastatal  sectors  - that  key  posts  were sometimes filled  by Zambians  who  had
had insufficient  training  or experience.  This  problem  became  particularly
acute  as regards  deficiencies  in  management  skills  - often  at  quite  senior
levels  of the  public  service. Finally,  those  non-citizens  who remained  in
employment  were often  concentrated  in particular  specialised  or technical
areas,  requiring  long  periods  of high-level  training. Thus  the  process  of
localising  the  remaining  jobs  held  by expatriates  appears  more  problematic
than  has  typically  been  the  case  in  the  past.  Equally,  the  premature
departure  of such  workers  would  generate  problems  that  would  be commensurately
more difficult  to solve.
Data  on the  characteristics  of those  in  wage or salaried  employment
in  Zambia  tend  to  be unreliable,  and  inconsistent  as  between  different
sources. It  is,.  therefore,  difficult  to  build  up an accurate  picture  of the
educational,  sectoral  and  occupational  composition  of  non-Zambian  employment.
Howeve- Table  8 shows  the  occupational  breakdown  of total  employment  as
revealea  by  a recent  manpower  survey,  which  is  of interest  given  the
comparatively  high  coverage  of the  formal  sector  which  it  achieved.4 The
table  shows  that,  although  non-citizens  were,  by 1983,  a comparatively  small
proportion  of total  employment  - less  than  5  per  cent  - they  were  nevertheless
proportionately  much  more important  in  professional  and  technical  occupations,
where  they  comprised  12  per  cent  of  employment,  and  in
administrative/managerial  jobs  where  they  accounted  for  more than  one-fifth  of
total  reported  employment.  It  can  be seen  from  Table  9,  which  shows  all
occupations  with  more  than  130  non-Zambian  workers,  that  some  occupations  in
the  professional  group  were still  heavily  dependent  upon  expatriate  skills.
The  case  of engineers  is  particularly  startling,  where  more  than  1000
expatriates  were employed,  comprising  almost  half  of all  such  workers. Zambia
also  remained  heavily  dependent  upon  expatriate  doctors. According  to the
survey,  they  comprised  more than  three-quarters  of all  doctors  in the  country
(although  this  proportion  is  probably  correct,  the  figures  are  significant
under-estimates  of the  absolute  number  of doctors  who  were employed).  Other
occupations  where  at least  one-quarter  of all  jobs  were occupied  by
non-citizens  include  physical  scientists,  statisticians,  accountants,
university  teachers,  and  managers. These  data  suggest,  therefore,  that  there
was in 1983  a significant  training  task  ahead  in order  to localise  all  of
these  professional  posts.
At first  sight  it  may seem  surprising  that  non-citizens  still
occupied  a large  number  of jobs  in  the 'production,  transport  and  related'
occupational  category:  they  comprised  almost  4,200  workers,  and  accounted  for
one-third  of all  non-citizens  employed  (Table  8).  Inspection  of the  more
detailed  tabulations  from  the  survey  reveals  that,  numerically,  the  largest
single  occupation  in this  category  is  miners  (736  non-Zambian  workers).
Nevertheless,  it can  be seen  from  Table  9 that  there  were also  substantial
numbers  of  non-citizen  production  supervisors  and  foremen  (597),  machinery
fitters  and  assemblers  (435),  electrical  fitters  (177),  plumbers  and  welders
(169),  bricklayers  and  carpenters  (259),  transport  equipment  operators  (425)
and  other  labourers  (741). Although  the  proportional  importance  of
non-citizens  in these  occupations  is  modest  - usually  less  than  5 per  cent  of17
Table  8  SIile  of  Emlovees  by  Maior  Occuvational  Group
and  Nationality,  1983
Occ. Group  Zambian  Non-Zambian  Total  (2)  as  %
(1)  (2)  (3)  of (3)
Professional,
technical  &
related  37,676  5,285  42,961  12.3
Admin.  &  -
managerial  2,563  744  3,307  22.5
Clerical  39,925  816  40,741  2.0
Sales  4,583  321  4,904  6.5
Service  35,580  752  36,332  2.1
Agriculture,
Forestry,  etc.  16,021  527  16,548  3.2
Production,
Transport  &
related  114,886  4,188  119,074  3.5
Not  stated  900  35  935  3.7
Total  252,134  12,668.  264,802  4.8
Estimated  %  of total
Employment  72  82  73
Sources: GRZ 1983;  GRZ 1985.- 18 -
total  workers  - these  data  do indicate  that  there  remained  a significant
shortage  of Zambian  artisans  in  many  of the  highly  skilled  craft  occupations,
both in  the  mining  sector  and  in other  areas  of  the  economy.
It should  be recalled,  however,  that  approximately  one  half  of all
non-citizen  workers  have long-term  residence  status,  and  are  not 'targets'  for
localisation  in  the  same  way as are  other  non-citizen  workers. The  manpower
survey  indicated  that  ovar  4,000  of the  6,000  or so expatriates  with  work
permits,  as  opposed  to residence  permits,  were in the  professiontl  and
technical  occupational  group. This  proportion  (70  per  cent)  compares  with
only  15 per  cent  of those  with residence  permits  who fell  into  this
occupational  group  (Table  10).  This  occupational  concentration  is also  to  be
expected  on the  basis  of the  educational  background  of  non-resident
expatriates  - 55  per  cent  of  whom  were reported  to  have  university  degrees,
with a further  20  per  cent  possessing  professional  qualifications  of  various
kinds.  (GRZ  1983:  Table  10.7). Thus,  most  of those  non-Zambians  shown  in
professional  jobs  in  Table  9  were  expatriates  who could  be localised  as  more
qualified  Zambians  become  available,  whereas  those  with long-term  resident
status  tended  to  work in  the  lower-level  craft,  primary  teaching,  clerical,
farming  and  nursing  occupations.
Thus,  the  recent  sharp  declines  in  the  number  and  proportions  of
non-citizens  employed  are  not so strongly  indicative  of an increased
availability  of Zambian  skills  as  they  might  first  appear. Considerable
numbers  of  expatriates  have  left  the  country  owing  to  the  declining  purchasing
power  of the  Kwacha. Those  who  have  left  the  public  sector  have  often  not
been replaced  - sometimes  because  of an inability  to attract  new staff,  and
sometimes  because  of a  wish to focus  the  impact  of expenditure  cuts  on
non-citizen,  rather  than  Zambian  staff. One  result  has  been  a significant
increase  in the  number  of  vacancies  amongst  professional  and  technical  grades
in  all sectors  of the  economy. Unfortunately,  comprehensive  data  on vacancies
in the  formal  se tor  are  not  available. The  1983  manpower  survey  did  not
collect  such  information,  nor  do the  quarterly  surveys  of employment  and
earnings  run  by the  CSO.  Nevertheless,  interviews  with senior  managers  in  all
sectors  of the  economy  during  1986  confirmed  that  an increase  in  vacancy  rates
was  very  widely  experienced  (UNDP  1986).
As for  the  public  sector,  more  concrete  information  is available.
The  civil  service  grew  fairly  rapidly  by,  on average,  almost  5  per  cent  per
year  over  the  eight  years  prior  to 1983. Payroll  costs  accounted,  during  this
period,  for  a growing  proportion  of public  expenditures.  In circumstances  of
increasing  financial  stringency,  expendl.tures  on supporting  services,  (such  as
transport  and  materials)  were reduced  to levels  incompatible  with efficiency.
In 1984  the  government,  at the  behest  of the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  and  as
part  of the  conditions  associated  with extending  new loan  facilities  to
Zambia,  agreed  to introduce  a freeze  on recruitment  to  the  administrative
cadre  of the  public  service. Thus,  a sharp  increase  in the  vacancy  rate
occurred,  and  by 1985  it  was estimated  that  some  10,000  of the  77,000
established  posts  in the  civil  service  were  vacant  (UNDP  1986:155). In  1986
GRZ  went further,  in announcing  its  intention  to  make  no new  appointments  to
the  public  service  without  the  special  authority  of the  Cabinet  Office,  and  to19
Table  9:  occupations  in  which  Non-citizens  are  concentrated.  1983
Occupation  Total  Zambian  Non-Zambian  (3)  as 4I
(1)  (2)  (3)  of (1)
Physical  Scientists  430  292  138  32.1
Architects  and  engineers  2,476  1,381  1,095  44.2
Engineering  technicians  3,222  2,874  348  10.8
Doctors  334  73  261  78.1
Nurses  and  midwives  4,104  3,798  396  9.6
Statisticians  and
related  technicians  832  625  207  24.9
Accountants  3,531  2,716  815  23.1
University  and  other
Higher  Ed. Teachers  1,472  1,081  391  26.6
Secondary  Teachers  3,410  2,775  635  18.6
Primary  Teachers  14,295  13,809  486  3.4
Managers  2,249  1,573  676  30.1
Stenographers  7,120  6,921  199  2.8
Book-keepers  7,278  7,160  188  2.6
General  clerks  15,669  15,430  239  1.5
Cooks  4,602  4,438  164  3.6
Protective  service
workers  18,362  18,083  279  1.5
Farm  managers  1,493  1,345  148  9.9
Agricultural  workers  13,348  13,030  318  2.4
Production  supervisors/
foremen  8,215  7,618  597  7.3
Miners  15,054  14,318  736  4.9
Machinery  fitters  11,345  10,910  435  3.8
Electrical  fitters  4,587  4,410  177  3.9
Plumbers,  welders  5,841  5,672  169  2.9
Bricklayers,  carpenters  9,270  9,011  259  2.8
Material  handlers  6,790  6,650  140  2.1
Transport  operators  9,846  9,421  425  4.3
Other labourers  29,410  28,669  741  2.5
sub-total  204,585  193,923  10,662  5.2
Other  workers
included  in survey  60,043  58,039  2,004  3.3
Total in  Survey  264,628  251,962  12,666  4.8
Source:  Calculated  from  GRZ 1983, Appendix  1.20
Table  10:  Non-Zambian  Employees,  bY type  of Permit  and  Maior  Occupation  Group.  1983
Work  Residence  Entry  Not  Total
Permit  Permit  Permit  Stated
Professional,  Technical
land  Related  4,263  944  23  48  5,285
IAdministrative  and
Managerial  364  362  6  12  744
,Clerical  127  678  1  9  816
Sales  116  20;  1  - 321
Service  140  580  5  28  752
Agricultural  165  358  2  2  527
Production,  Transport
& Related  840  3,000  100  249  4,189
Not Stated  11  22  - 1  34
Total  in Survey  6,033  6,149  138  349  12,668
Source: GRZ 1983, Table 10.0.- 21 -
cut  the  daily  paid  employee  work force  by 40 per  cent (about  20,000  jobs)  over
a two  year  period.
Data  are  not  yet  available  with  which  to review  the  detailed  impact
of these  measures. Nevertheless,  various  sources  report  that  they  have tended
to further  undermine  the  effectiveness  of the  public  service,  rather  than  to
improve  its  efficiency.  The  problem  is that  retirement,  or contract  expiry,
does  not  necessarily  occur  in  a  way  which  reflects  manpower  priorities.  An
unstructured  approach  to  reducing  public  sector  staffing  via 'natural  wastage'
may  therefore  compound  the  problems  of  production  and  service  delivery.
An example  can  be given  from  the  Ministry  of  Health,  which,  in 1985
undertook  a review  of  medical  manpower. High  and  unevenly  distributed  vacancy
rates  for  nurses  and  technicians  were causing  major  difficulties  for  the
provision  of health  care,  particularly  away  from  urban  centres. The  situation
amongst  doctors,  however,  was particularly  critical. Table  11 shows  how the
staffing  position  developed  between  1981  and  1985. It can  be seen  that
although  there  was a  net reduction  of  86 expatriate  doctors  over  those  years,
they  were 'replaced'  .y  an increase  of  only  41 Zambian  doctors. Thus,  the
vacancy  rate  rose  from  20 to 30  per  cent  over  the  period,  after  allowing  for
increases  in the  number  of  posts  in  the  establishment.  Again  the  shortages
varied  widely  in  different  parts  of the  country  - with  vacancies  reaching
almost  60  per  cent  at  Ndola  hospital  on the  copperbelt.  As it  happens,  these
vacancies  were caused  more  by the  deterioration  in  the  value  of local  salaries
paid to  doctors  than  by the  freeze.  But  they  are  illustrative  of the
potentially  misleading  import  of aggregate  data  on localisation  'progress'
over  the  past  decade.  The  shortage  of skills  remains  an important  rigidity
in the  Zambian  economy  - increasing  the  costs  of economic  restructuring,  and
reducing  both its  speed  and  potency.
Earnings  and  Labour  Costs.  The  issue  of  wages  and  incomes  policy
and  performance  in Zambia  has received  considerable  academic  attention  in  the
past,  with  notable  contributions  from  Knight  1971,  Dan.el  1979,  Pry 1979  and
Meesook  et al 1986. These  generally  showed  that  the  wc-cders  in the  copper
industry  had  acted  as  wage leaders  for  those  in  other  s,^ctors,  and that  the
strength  of their  organisation,  combined  with the  goverr.mint's  willingness  to
accede  to their  demands  in  the  early  years  after  indepetdence,  had  established
Zambia  as a  high  wage economy  from  an  early  stage. There  was lively  debate  as
to the  extent  to  which  wage increases  presented  a 'problem'  for  the  country's
development.  Jolly  and  Williams  (1971)  showed  that  about  half  of the  increase
in the  cost  of living  over  the  late  19609  could  be statistically  attributed  to
increased  wage  costs. In a  period  where  the  economy  received  increasing
windfall  gains  from  the  rise  in  copper  prices,  such  increases  in  average
earnings  could  be accommodated  - even  though  the  competitiveness  of industry
outside  copper  was badly  affected. There  was, therefore,  a certain
complacency  about  these  trends  expressed  at the  time,  and  even  by  more recent
commentators  (eg  Fry  1979a  84-85). Whatever  view  one  took  of that  early
period,  by the  time  of the  copper  price  fall  in  1975,  the  Zambian  economy  was
in  no  way able  to restructure  production  easily  away  from  copper,  into
manufacturing  or service  production.  Its  wages  in the  non-agricultural  sector
had  by this  time  become  considerably  higher  than  in  most  countries  of a
similar  size,  structure  and  income  level. This  is  demonstrated  by the22
Table  11:  Staffing Levels of Doctors. 1981-85
Year  Establishment  Zambian  Non-Zambian  Vacancies  Vacancy
Rate %
1981  808  62  577  169  21
1982  808  79  586  143  18
1983  830  92  584  154  19
1984  830  88  531  211  25
1985  850  103  491  256  30
Source:  Ministry  of Health, Manpower Development Office- 23  -
analysis  shown  in the  Appendix. Data  are  available  for  19 countries  which
allow  a comparison  of  monthly  wage-earnings  and  per  capita  incomes.  For  these
purposes  the  year  1976  has  been  selected  in  order  to illustrate  the  relative
position  of Zambian  wage-earners  one  year  after  the  fall  in  the  copper  price.
It should  be noted  that  Zambia  is  not selectively  disadvantaged  by the
particular  year  chosen  for  this  comparison,  since  the  real  average  earnings  of
Zambian  employees  remained  approximately  constant  between  1975  and  1980 (Table
12).  As explained  in  the  Appendix,  there  are  methodological  and  statistical
problems  which  affect  this  kind  of comparison.  Nevertheless,  some  important
contrasts  emerge.
Zambia  is shown  to  be a  high-wage  economy. This  can  be demonstrated
in a  number  of  different  ways.  First,  and  most  obvious,  is  the  question  of
the  absolute  value  of  wages  paid in  Zambia  in  comparison  with  other  countries.
The  Appendix  Table  shows  that  average  monthly  earnings  from  wages  outside
agriculture  were generally,  in 1976,  two-to-three  times  the  US dollar  value  of
any  of the  other  six  sub-Saharan  African  countries  included  in the  comparison.
Although  Zambian  wage-earnings  were roughly  similar  to those  in  Papua  New
Guinea,  Cuba  and  Costa  Rica,  the  only  country  where  earnings  (converted  to  US
dollars)  were significantly  higher  was  Venezuela  - much richer  than  Zambia,
and  with by far  the  highest  per  capita  income  of any  country  in  the  sample.
The results  are similar  for  agricultural  wages. Of the  eleven
countries  for  which  comparable  data  are  available,  only  two (Korea  and  Cuba)
appear  to have  paid  higher  agricultural  wages  than  Zambia  in  1976.  The  latter
were  about  20 per  cent  more  than  the  average  for  all  countries  having  the
relevant  data (compared  with  a 33  per  cent  differential  for  non-agricultural
wages).
As for  the  ratio  between  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  wages
Zambia  appears  not to  have  been  unusual. Its  wage ratio  at 2.62  is  fairly
close  to the  mean  value  (2.49)  for  all  countries  shown  in  column  9 of the
Appendix  Table. Furthermore,  Zambia  shares  the  median  ranking  with  Costa
Rica.  It is  not, therefore,  the  relative  levels  of rural  and  urban  wages
which  have  distinguished  Zambia  from  elsewhere,  but,  rather,  the  absolute
level  of  wages  paid,  in  all  sectors,  in  comparison  with other  similar
countries.
A further  way to analyse  the  earnings  data is  to compare  them  with
levels  of  per  capita  income. This is  done  in  column  8  where  the  ratios  of
earnings  outside  agriculture  to  per  capita  incomes  are  shown. Once  again,
Zambia  emerges  well up in the  rankings. Only  Burundi  and  Kenya  have  higher
ratios  than  Zambia. Both  of these  countries  are  considerably  less  well off
than  Zambia,  and,  at least  in  Burundi's  case,  the  outcome  is  more influenced
by the  low  value  for  the  denominator  (per  capita  income)  than  by the  numerator
(earnings)  being  high.  Finally,  it is  worth  noting  that  all  of the  countries
which  were poorer  than  Zambia  in 1976  had a  wage structure  which  was also
absolutely  lower  - mostly  by a considerable  margin. For  the  nine  countries  in
this  category,  the  value  of  non-agricultural  earnings  in seven  of them  were
half,  or less,  those  in  Zambia. Agricultural  sector  differentials  were less
dramatic,  but  remained  sharp.24
Table 12  Average  Annual  Real  Earnings  of Employees  by Sector  1965-83  (1975  Kwacha)(a
1965  1970  1975  1980  1983
Agriculture,  Forestry,  Fishing
Zambian  327  492  453  518  393
Non-Zambian  4410  6350  2524  2902  1215
Mining  and  Quarrying
Zambian  1570  2179  1478  1668  1186
Non-Zambian  10034  10254  6784  5278  3604
Manufacturing
Zambian  924  1133  1179  1063  756
Non-Zambian  5836  7590  5657  5243  2972
Construction
Zambian  612  860  764  805  632
Non-Zambian  6549  9694  6868  3847  2850
Transport
Zambian  924  1710  1834  1308  1006
Non-Zambian  5743  6651  7377  5182  2662
Services(b)
Zambian  869  1119  1246  1146  884
Non-Zambian  5149  5535  4894  4278  2726
Total
Zaambian  890  1210  1140  1134  851
Non-Zambian  6476  7207  5572  4601  2897
Notes:  a - generally  4th  quarter  figures. Nominal  earnings  estimates  for  Zambians
deflated  by low-income  CPI.  Those  for  non-Zambians  are  deflated  by the  high-
income  CPI.
b - includes  utilities,  trade,  hotels,  finance  and  other  services.
Source:  Meesook  et  al,  1986:  Appendix  Table  3- 25 -
These  results  are  important  from  the  standpoint  of international
competitiveness.  They  do  not,  of course,  decisively  indicate  the  existence  of
differences  in labour  costs. Such  judgements  would  reguire  additional
information  upon the  productivity  of labour  amongst  the  countries  in the
sample. Nevertheless  the  differences  which  have  been  revealed  are  sharp
enough  to require  implausibly  high  productivity  lev-els  in Zambia  relative  to
other  similar  countries,  if such  labour  cost  differences  in  the  mid 19708  were
not to  have  held.  There  can  be little  doubt,  then,  that  the  level  of  wages
(and  labour  costs)  were  higher  than  would  be easily  compatible  with Zambia
rapidly  increasing  her export  revenues  in  manufacturing  and  other
'non-traditional'  sectors  in  order  to fill  the  gap  created  by lost  earnings
from  copper  exports. A  reduction  in  wages  would  by no  means  have  been
sufficient  to achieve  such  diversification,  but  it is  clear  from  the  above
comparisons that  such  a change  would  have  been  a  necessary  component  of any
serious  attempt  to respond  to the  country's  changed  trading  circumstances.
The  movement  of average  earnings  in real  terms  for  the  first  two
decades  of independence  is  shown,  in  constant  1975  prices,  in  Table  12.
Average  earnings  peaked  in  1970. But  the  fall  to 1975  was primarily  caused  by
the  decline  in  average  earnings.in  the  copper  industry.  Wage increases  during
the  1970s  in  the  mining  sector  were less  than  the  rate  of inflation,  and
represented  a period  of  consolidation  after  the  very large  increases  in
earnings  granted  to  mineworkers  resulting  from  the  Brown  Commission  in :966.
In  most  other  sectors  average  earnings  continued  to rise  until  1975,
particularly  in  services  which  - at least  as  defined  in Table  12 - covered  a
large  proportion  of total  formal  employment.  By this  time,  therefore,  the
mining  sector  was  no longer  exerting  successful  wage  leadership  over  the  rest
of the  economy.5
The  picture  appeared  to  change,  however,  over  the  following  years.
By 1983  the  average  earnings  of Zambian  employees  had  fallen  to three-quarters
of their  1975  level,  with sharper  declines  being  experienced  by workers  in
manufacturing,  transport  and  services. These  declines  in real  earnings  came
from  a  number  of sources,  including  changes  in  the  structure  of the  employed
labour  force,  changes  in the  earnings  structure,  and  movements  in  nominal
earnings  which  less  than  fully  compensated  for  inflation. It is  not possible,
on the  basis  of  available  data,  to  dissentangle  the  relative  importance  of
each  of these  variables  to the  net results  summarised  in Table  12.  It is
clear,  however,  that  government  policy  towards  wages  and  salaries  had  a more
profound  effect  upon  the  earnings  structure  - particularly  after  1980  - than
had  been  the  case  earlier  on.  This  occurred  in a  number  of  ways.
First,  the  main instrument  which  had  led  to  the  relative  protection
of real  wages  in Zambia  had  been  the  exchange  rate  - which  had  appreciated
slightly  over  the  early  1970s. Since  most  consumption  goods  are  imported,
exchange  appreciation  reduces,  ceteris  paribus,  the  Kwacha  cost-of-living.
Following  the  devaluation  in  1976,  however,  the  value  of the  currency
continued  to  move downwards.  This  gathered  pace  from  1980  onwards,  and  by 1983
the  Kwacha  had  been reduced  to about  half  of its  value  in 1975. It can  be
seen  from  Table  13 that  the  impact  upon  domestic  inflation  was substantial,
with  the  rate  doubling  to  20 per  cent  per  year  between  1975  and  1983. These- 26 -
were circumstances  in  which  it  was easier  to achieve  reductions  in the  real
wage and  salary  bill  in all  sectors  of  the  economy.
Second,  although  the  income  decline  was suffered  by  workers
throughout  the  formal  sector,  the  earnings  losses  were felt  particularly
strongly  by those  in  the  public  sector. Between  1975  and 1980,  for  example,
workers  in  the  public  sector  experienced  a 16  per  cent  decline  in  real
earnings,  yet  those  in  the  parastatals  suffered  only  a one  per  cent loss,
whilst  Zambian  employees  in  the  private  sector  were,  on average,  14  per  cent
better  off  over  the  period.6 After  1980,  on the  other  hand,  the  real  earnings
of  workers  in  all  sectors  fell  as inflation  gathered  pace (Tables  12 and  13).
Survey  data  are  not  yet available  to  allow  discussion  of trends  in average
earnings  beyond  1983. Yet it  was in later  years  that  the  major  changes  in
macroeconomic  policies  occurred. Although  these  changes  were introduced
primarily  to deal  with the  economy's  structural  disequilibrium  on the  balance
of payments,  they had  sharp  implications  for  the  distribution  of incomes  in
Zambia,  and  for  trends  in  real  earnings  from  formal  sector  employment.  Again,
public  sector  workers  were affected  most,  although  earnings  in all  sectors
were severely  reauced.
This  is illustrated  by Table  14  which  shows  the  development  of the
government's  general  administrative  salary  scale  (covering  all  sections  of the
service)  since  1967.  The  nominal  salaries  payable  have  been  converted,  in
Table  15,  into  real  terms,  and  are  expressed  as ratios  of real  salaries  in
1975. A number  of conclusions  can  be drawn  from  this  table. First,  the
government  has  consistently  narrowed  the  gap  between  the  highest  and  lowest
salaries  in  the  administration  over  the  past  twenty  years. Top  salaries
declined  sharply  in real  terms  to 1975,  whilst  the  lowest  paid  employees
continued  to enjoy  real  earnings  increases  until  that  date.  Subsequently,
although  the  real  earnings  of all  government  employees  declined,  the  fall  was
much sharper  and  faster  for  the  senior  officers  than  for  those  in junior
positions. By 1982  the  better  paid  had  lost  between  40 and  50 per  cent  of
their  1975  real  earnings,  whereas  earlier  losses  were  made good  somewhat  for
the  lowest  paid,  such  that  in  1983  they  were still  only  10 per  cent  worse  off
than  in  the  mid-70s. These  trends  continued  between  1983  and  1985,  with the
real  incomes  of all  except  the  very lowest  paid  dropping  to  well below
one-third  of their  1975  level.
In October  1985  the  government  implemented  a salaries  revision. For
the  administrative  grades  of the  service  the  increases  were in two  stages  -
the  first  payable  in  October  1985,  and  the  second  instalment  payable  in  June
the  following  year.  It can  be seen  from  Table  15 that  this  review  continued
the  earlier  policy  of narrowing  the  income  gaps  in the  salary  structure.
Nevertheless,  even  after  implementation  of the  first  part  of the  review,  most
grades  received  less  than  one  third  the  real  value  of their  1975  earnings.
The  junior  clerical  and  unskilled  groups  fared  better,  but  their  earnings  fell
to less  than  three-quarters  of their  1975  level.  Moreover,  these  changes
coincided  with the  introduction  of the  weekly  foreign  exchange  auction  and  a
resulting  70  per  cent  devaluation  of the  Kwacha  (see  Table  13). During  1986
prices  rose  by  more  than  50 per  cent  above  their  levels  of the  preceding  year,
primarily  as a result  of the  massive  increase  in import  prices  engendered  by
devaluation. By  consequence,  the  additional  nominal  salary  increases  that27
TABLE !3:
Average  Annual  Kwacha/Dpllar  Exchanqe  Rates  and Inflation:  Selected  Years
Urban  CPI  Annual  % change  in  CPI
US $  per Kwacha  Low  Inc  High  Inc  Low  Inc  High  Inc
1970  1.40
1975  1.55  100.0  100.0  10.1  8.5
1980  1~27  202.9  189.4  11.7  11.9
1981  1.15  231.3  209.1  14.0  10.4
1982  1.08  260.2  236.7  12.5  13.2
1983  0.80  311.2  278.6  19.6  17.7
1984  0.56  373.5  336.8  20.0  20.9
1985  0.37  513.5  446.6  37.5  32.8
1986  July-Sept  0. 16(a)  778.4  707.2  51.6  58.4
1987  April(b)  0. 05(a)  938.3  921.6  37.4  52.4
May  0.125(a)
Notes: (a)  From  October 1985  onwards  the value  of the  Kwacha  was  determined  at
a weekly auction  of foreign  exchange. Wide fluctuations  took  place
during  1986.  The value shown  is the  average  value  obtaining  in  the
months July-September.  Further deterioration  took place.  The
lowest  value  reached  is that  shown  for  April 1987. As from  May 1987
the auction was suspended,  and the Kwacha's  value was pegged at
US$0.125.
(b)  CPI figures for 1987  are for the  month of January.  Inflation  rate
for 1987  calculated  by comparing  these  data with January  1986  CPI,
as reported  by CSO.
Sources:  World  Bank 1986,  Bank  of Zambia,  and  GRZ 1987.1:  GwmiU  Aitiattiv  g:le:  1967-0614g
Scale  post  am. 67  mne  71  July  75  Jan 79  Jan.  80  Jan.  82  Jan.  83  Nov. 83  Oct.  85  July  86
33  iamr-Sscretsry  6.250  7.600  7,812  7.914  10.176  10,176  10.176  10,176  11,536  12,216
87  Assistant  Director  5,120  5,800  6.324  6,468  7.440  7,40  7,440  7,440  8,680  9.300
U12  Oniv.  Grad.  (gntzfl(b)  2.184  2,340  2,976  3,132  3.852  3,870  3,876  3.992  4.931  5,400
S13  Diploa  Intry  1.72S  1,860  2,388  2,544  3.264  3,300  33,336  3,465  4,283  4.692
Sal  Lmst  FPid Salaried  312  396  540  696  984  1.164  1,324  1,470  2.:46  2,464
bvior
Unskilled
non-established  n.G.  342  480  636  840  1,056  1,236  1.382  2.060  2,400
: 
h.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
(a)  lb dates  abn represent  dates  of  lplentation  for  all  salaries  coiasboas  fra  1967 arwards.
(b)  k  entry  polnt  mm moved  upwardr In  1979.  Salaries  aomn before  that  date  were not  entry  points,  but  wro  the  equivalent
polint  co  the  scale  to  tUe  shwam  for  later  years.
":  Ibr  scace  prior  to  Octobr  1965, see Neeook at  .1, 1986, Table  A.l.3:  76. For October 1905 and Jam  1986, see GRZ  1906s.olaJ  1S:  l.ndle  cf  rdl  eMlrl.  In the  Public  Sector:  Ganral  Mdai.trative  Scale  11975 - 100)
Scale  Poet  Jan.67  hNy  71  July  75  Jan  79  Aug. 80  Jan.  82  Jan.  83  'Mv.  83  Oct.  85  July  86
53  Under-Secretar'  135  132  100  60  60  59  5i  45  29  22
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were introduced  in  June  1986  had  already  been  completely  eroded  by inflation
prior  to their  implementation.  Even  after  their  receipt,  employees  were  worse
off  than  in  October  1985  by between  15 and  24 per  cent  at the  bottom  and  top
of the  service,  respectively  (Table  15).  Thus,  the  cuts  in  real  earnings
incurred  in 1985/6  were sharper,  for  most  workers,  than  the  real  earnings  loss
which  they  had incurred  during  the  previous  decade.  This  was dramatically  so
for  unskilled  wage  employees.  It seemed  then  that  the  sharp  decline  in the
exchange  rate  following  from  the  auction  would  sharply  reduce  wage costs
throughout  the  whole  range  of skills.  But  these  changes  proved  to be
short-lived,  and  their  early  success  did  not imply  that  a  new  era  of  wage
flexibility  had  arrived.
Impact  of the  1985  IMF  stabilisation  package  on the  Labour  Market
The  decade  ending  in 1985  had  been  difficult  for  many  Zambians. Job
prospects  for  school-leavers  had  deteriorated  and  unemployment  in  the  urban
centres  had increased.  By consequence  those  years  witnessed  a significant
increase  in the  proportion  of the  population  dependent  upon informal  and
subsistence  agricultural  production.  Yet  here,  too,  incomes  remained
depressed,  as earlier  sections  have indicated.  Agricultural  production  per
capita  stagnated,  or  declined,  between  1970  and  1985  - even  in  the  face  of  a
potentially  highly  fertile  and  productive  physical  environment,  with  much
lower  ratios  of population  to cultivable  land  than  in countries  like  Kenya,
Tanzania  and  Malawi.  The  rural  areas  were thus  unable  to  provide  an easy
alternative  for  those  increasingly  excluded  from  participation  in  formal
sector  work.
The  package  of policy  reforms  introduced  at the  behest  of the  IMF  in
1985  initially  appeared  to offer  promise  of a solution  to some  of Zambia's
most  urgent  structural  problems. Under  these  reforms,  interest  rates  were
de-controlled  (and  reached  30 per  cent for  some  borrowers);  a foreign  exchange
auction  was introduced,  accompanied  by the  abandonment  of import  licensing;
agricultural  producer  prices  were substantially  raised  and  the  monopoly  of
agricultural  marketing  enjoyed  by the  National  Agricultural  Marketing  Board
was ended. These  reforms  were  welcomed  by the  aid  community,  and  were  marked
by the  signing  of a two-year  Stand-By  Arrangement  with the  IMF,  and  by
agreements  to reschedule  $500mn  of debts  owed  to the 'Paris  Club'  group  of
official  creditors.
The  direct  impact  of these  measures  upon  wage rates  has  been
indicated  above:  earnings  were sharply  reduced  at all  levels;  but,  for  the
first  time  since  the  onset  of Zambia's  economic  problems  in  1975,  the  real
value  of unskilled  and  minimum  wages  were sharply  reduced. These  changes
directly  and  quickly  reduced  real  wage costs  ii  the  formal  sector,  having  an
immediate  impact  upon  the  economy's  productivLty  and  competitiveness,  at least
in foreign  exchange  terms. Equally  the  higher  prices  obtainable  by producers
of 'tradeable'  goods  changed  internal  relative  prices  sharply  in favour  of
agriculture,  manufacturing  and  copper  production,  and  away  from  services  and
the  production  of other  'non-tradeables'.
Yet,  at the  same  time,  the increased  opportunities  presented  by the
reforms  were also  associated  with sharply  increased  costs  for  some  members  of- 31 -
the  population.  Wage  and salary  e&rners  were obviously  the  most directly  hit.
But  other  groups  were also  affected. Unemployment  was initially  worsened  by
reductions  in  public  spending,  by the  imposition  of the  freeze  on recruitment
to established  posts,  and  by reductions  in the 'daily  paid'  public  sector
labour  force. Workers  in  the  informal  sector  suffered  in at least  two  ways:
first,  they  faced  reductions  in the  demand  for  the  goods  and  services  which
they  produce,  owing  to the  declining  wage incomes  received  by the  formally
employed. Second,  the  sharp  reductions  in  formal  sector  incomes  forced  many
with jobs  to engage  in 'moonlighting'  - thereby  swelling  the  numbers
participating  in informal  urban  activities,  and  forcing  a reduction  in the
average  incomes  earned  from  these  activities.  Equally,  those  wh,o  were
dependent  on government  services  - particularly  education,  health  and
extension  - experienced  a decline  in  their  real  incomes  resulting  from
expenditure  cuts. These  costs  particularly  affected  those  with large
families,  single  parent  households,  the  old,  the  sick  and  the  infirm.
This  downward  pressure  upon  other  incomes  which  the  reductions  in
public  spending,  increasing  levels  of unemployment  and  declining  real  wages
set  in train,  had  wide implications.  A  sample  survey  undertaken  early  in  1986
amongst  100  low-income  Lugaka  households  showed  that  the  majority  had
significantly  changed  th,  composition  of their  diets  since  the  auctioning  of
foreign  exchange  had  began  in October  1985. In particular,  the  quantity  of
more  expensive,  high  protein  foods  which  had  previously  been  bought  had  been
reduced,  and  often  substituted  by  mealie  meal.  Some  of the  very  poorest
households  in  the  sample,  however,  had  also  reduced  their  purchases  of
staples. Within  the  group,  female-headed  households  were shown  to be most  at
risk,  since  they  were often  dependent  upon  a single,  irregular  income  source
(UNDP  1986:22).
More generally,  incomes  in  the  informal  sector  were  threatened
during  the  initial  period  of policy  reform,  largely  because  of the  sharply
declining  incomes  of the  wage-earners,  on  whom they  depended  for  their  market.
This,  together  with rising  levels  of urban  unemployment  implied  that  the
incidence  of serious  hardship  within  the  urban  centres  increased  significantly
over  the  short-term.  As regards  poorer  families  in  the  country  as a  whole  the
short-term  impact  of adjustment  was  also  probably  negative. For  rural
producers  the re-structuring  of relative  prices  should  have  been relatively
advantageous  - except  for  that  important  group  of food  producers  in isolated
communities,  where  the  previous  policy  of  panterritorial  pricing  had  provided
a cross-subsidy  from  those  closer  to the  line  of rail. Equally  vulnerable
were poorer  households  with large  families. For  them  the  previous  decade  had
been  characterised  by falling  standards  of  educational  provision,  medical  care
and  nutrition. Now, further  reductions  in government  health  and  education
budgets  in  many  parts  of the  country  (including  the  urban  areas)  selectively
disadvantaged  those  households  which  - on account  of family  size  - had the
lowest  per  capita  incomes. Equally,  of course,  they  hit the  prospects  for
long-term  economic  growth  by undermining  the  quality  and  effectiveness  of the
nation's  future  human  capital.
Reiection  of  Reform.  During  1986  the  exchange  rate  had fluctuated
between  KS and  K14.6  per  US dollar,  (compared  with  a rate  of  K2.2  which  had
prevailed  prior  to  October  1985). The  inflation  rate  generated  by the- 32 -
floating  of the  Kwacisa  (Table  13),  and  the  impact  this  had  upon  domestic
incomes,  discussed  above,  caused  GRZ increasing  concern. Extensive  rioting
broke  out  in  the  Copperbelt  towns  in  December  1986,  following  an  attempted
doubling  of the  price  of  maize-meal  by the  government,  as  part  of its
commitment  to the  IMF  to remove  consumer  subsidies.  These  and  other
indications  of dissent  resulted  in  a series  of reversals  of economic  policy.
At the  end  of  January  1987,  the  price  of the  Kwacha  was pegged  in a range  of
K9 to K12.50  per  US$  - the  actual  price  to  be determined  by  weekly  auction
bids.  This  was followed  by further  modifications  to the  system  notablv,  in
March,  by the  announcement  of a two-tier  exchange  rate  system,  only  part  of
which  was to be determined  by the  market.
The  difficulties,  however,  continued. The  auction-determined  rate
for  the  Kwacha  continued  to fall  sharply;  strikes  and  outspoken  criticism  or
government  policies  increased.  At the  beginning  of  May - by  which  time  the
Kwache  had fallen  to  K21  per  US$  - President  Kaunda  suspended  negotiations
with the  IMf. Ha discontinued  the  auction  and  imposed  a  new fixed  rate  of  K8
per  USS. Debt service  payments  were to  be limited  to 10  per  cent  of export
eanaings,  net  of the  import  requirements  for  the  mining  sector,  the  airways,
and  of fuel  and  fertiliser.  Interest  rates  were  cut  by 5  per  cent,  and  price
control  was resurrected.  Foreign  exchange  licensing  was also  to  be introduced
once  again.
These  changes  represented  a complete  abandonment  of the  policy
reform  programme,  and  a return  to the  earlier  regime. They  were a consequence
of the  speed  and  intensity  with  which  the  IMF  programme  had  been  applied.
Large  sections  of the  labour  force  had  been  impoverished  by the  stabilisation
package  - including  those  sections  of the  community  upon  which  the  government
continued  to  depend  for  support. Although  the  revisionist  stance  could  hardly
have  made the  country's  foreign  exchange  position  worse,  it  was Zambia's
long-term  prospects  for  diversification  and  growth  which  were  probably  most
affected  by tnese  events.
Conclusion.
This  paper  has  examined  conditions  in  the  Zambian  labour  market
during  just  over  a decade  of economic  decline.  The  causes  of the  sharp  falls
in income  which  occurred  in  1975  were external; the  result  of extreme  export
and income  dependence  upon  the  production  of one  commodity  - copper  - the
price  of  which  was  halved  in 1975,  and  which  did  not recover  until  1988/89.
The reasons  why the  Zambian  economy  then  stagnated  for  more than  a decade
were,  however,  primarily  internal  (with  the  important  exception  of the  further
deterioration  in terms  of trade  caused  by the  second  oil  crisis  in 1978/9).
This  paper  has  argued  that  two  particular  'rigidities'  in  the  labour  market
made important  contributions  to this  lack  of  economic  response.
The  first  of these  'rigidities'  was  the  persistence  of  high level
skill-shortages  throughout  the  formal  sector.  These  have  acted  as a
constraint  on growth  and  diversification  in  a number  of  ways.  First  they
have increased  costs  of production.  Although  production  bottlenecks  were
partly  avoided  by recruitment  of  expatriates,  the  unit  costs  of such  workers
have  been  typically  a large  multiple  of the  local  earnings  associated  with  the- 33 -
job  in question.  Thus  the  shortage  of Zambian  skills,  and  the  associated
high  dependence  upon  non-citizen  personnel  has  made the  costs  of industrial
expansion  and  growth  greater  than  they  would  otherwise  have  been.  Second,
during  the  years  after  1975,  there  is  evidence  that  the  wish  by the  GRZ  to
make faster  progress  with localisation,  the  increasing  difficulties  of living
in Zambia  for  foreigners,  and,  in later  years,  the  reduced  real  value  of
benefits  on offer,  led  to  a faster  reduction  in  expatriate  employment  than  was
desirables  vacancy  rates  in skilled  jobs  rose,  and  the  replacement  of
expatriates  by insufficiently  skilled/expertenced  Zambians  became  more
frequent.  There  are  other  costs  associated  with  dependence  upon  non-citizen
skilled  workers  which  economic  analysis  often  overlooks.  Cultural  and
attitudinal  differences  can  often  hamper  relationships  at the  workplace.
Expatriate  entrepreneurs  may  be more interested  in short-run  profit
maximisation  than  in longer-run  accumulation  and  output  growth.  The  process
of innovation,  and  of providing  risk  capital  for  new  ventures  is  probably
different  if the  relevant  skills,  experience  and  capital  are  mainly  in
non-citizen  hands.  Under  these  circumstances,  labour  productivity  was held
back and  opportunities  to  expand  production,  where  they  existed,  could  often
not be  exploited.
Wage rigidity  was the second - and probably  more important - feature
of the  labour  market  which  contributed  strongly  to the  years  of stagnation.
The  paper  has shown,  using  a  number  of different  indicators,  that  in the  mid
1970s  real  wages  in Zambia  were  very  high in  comparison  with other  countries.
In spite  of increased  production  difficulties  and  rapidly  rising
unemployment,  the  paper  has  also  shown  that  real  wages  were  maintained,  on
average,  to 1980,  and  then  fell  modestly  to 1983  (although  with sharp
differences  between  sectors).  In these  circumstances  the  possibility  of
expanding  the  production  of tradeable  goods  was  sharply  constrained  by
Zambia's  lack  of international  competitiveness. Although  other  factors  were
also  unfavourable,  high  wage costs  were an important  source  of Zambia's
difficulties  at this  time.
It is important  to  understand  why these  features  can  properly  be
described  as 'rigidities'  in  the  labour  market.  This  is so in the  sense  that
they  constituted  barriers  to production  which  were  not removed  - or even
significantly  reduced  - by the  operation  of the  market  mechanism.  Market
signals  thus  proved  inadequate  to the  task  of securing  the resource
reallocation  necessary  to stimulate  production.  In  the  case  of the  skill
shortages,  the  rigidity  proved  unresponsive  even  in the  face  of high  personal
returns  to investment  in  post-secondary  education  and  training,  and  high costs
of expatriate  recruitment.  It  was  not, then,  a  matter  of incorrect  market
signals  - but  of inadequate  response.  Nor  did  this  response  appear  to  be
constrained  by state  policy.  The  shortage  has  not  been so  much a function  of
too  few  student  places  in  post-secondary  education  and  training,  as of a
shortage  of adequately  qualified  or  motivated  students  emerging  from  the
schools.  In short  it appears  that  the  intractability  of the  skill  shortage
is only  partly  caused  by state  policy  - it is  equally  strongly  related  to
matters  of social  and  economic  history,  of custom  and  culture  and  of a lack  of
industrial  and  job-related  experience.  These  factors  probably  have  as  much
importance  in  explaining  th-  general  aconomic  demise  of sub-Saharan  Africa  as- 34 -
they  do in the  Zambian  case.  Much  more  analysis  of them  is  needed  in  this.
and  other  country  contexts.
In the  case  of  wages,  we are  dealing  with the  rigidity  of an
economic  signal  - an  even  clearer  case  of  market  failure.  Wage levels  were
maintained  in  spite  of  a sharp  rise  in  open  unemployment  in the  urban  centres
and  a decline  in the  profitability  of large  sections  of industry.  This  was
partly  a reflection  of the  power  of labour  vis--vis  the  employers  - a
historical  legacy  from  the  19609  when  the  copper  industry  unions  demonstrated
to the  rest  of Zambian  labour  the  benefits  to  be gained  from  organisation.
Yet it  was perhaps  more strongly  a product  of government  policy  throughout  the
period  - and therefore  a rigidity  promoted  (or  permitted)  by State  action
rather  than  by structural  or  historical  circumstance.
The  key issue  here  was the  government's  use  of the  exchange  rate
instrument.  Although  a series  of  nominal  devaluations  did  occur  after  1975,
these  were rarely  sufficient  to  compensate  for  the  differential  in the
inflation  rate  between  Zambia  and  her  main trading  partners.  The  effects  of
this  were on the  one  hand to  preserve  the  purchasing  power  of  wages  and
salaries,  and  on the  other  to  do little  to increase  the  incentives  to engage
in  agricultural  and  other  'non-traditional'  export  production.  During  this
period  the  government  appeared  to  be responding  to  a primarily  urban  employed
and self-employed  constituency.  Between  1980  and  1984,  on the  other  hand,
there  were increasing  signs  of  willingness  on the  part  of the  government  to
change  important  aspects  of economic  policy.  The  exchange  rate  was reduced
more sharply,  and  nominal  wage increases  were  held  below  the  rate  of
inflation;  government  spending  was cut  back  after  1983,  and  efforts  to
increase  public  revenues  were  made.  The  path  taken  towards  reform  was  gradual
and  not  without  deviation.  Furthermore,  its  impact  on  macro  indicators  had  not
yet - by 1984 - been substantial.
The  policy  reforms  which  were introduced  in 1985  changed  things
dramatically.  Those  who  had  been  protected  under  the  1975-80  policy  stance
were hardest  hit  by massive  escalation  of import  prices  engendered  by the
auction.  In the  short-run,  however,  almost  everyone  lost  out.  The  changes
caused  a sharp  change  in relative  prices  - in favour  of the  producers  of
agricultural  and  manufactured  goods.  But  there  was a lag  before  production
could  respond  - during  which  time  production  inputs,  food  and  other  consumer
goods  had  to be financed  at the  new  higher  prices.  The  rejection  of reform,
and  of the  DMF  programme,  by the  government,  was certainly  a triumph  for  the
sectional  interests  favoured  by policy  during  1975-80.  But their  victory  was
made  easier  by the  speed  and severity  of economic  change  which  had  hurt even
those  who  were to benefit  in  the  medium  term.  It is  possible,  given  the
composition  of power  within  the  ruling  party,  that  a  continuation  of the  more
gradualist  approach  to  policy  reform  that  characterised  1980-84  would  also,
eventually,  have  been  rejected.  But  it  would  certainly  have reduced  the
strength  of reaction  and  the  size  of those  groups  opposing  reform.  It is
much  more  likely  that  the  direction  of reform  could  have  been  maintained  than
was the  case  with the  IMF  package,  which,  in its  design,  ignored  the  laoour
market  rigidities  identified  in this  paper,  and  which  omission  ultimately  led
to its  rejection  by the  Zambian  people  and  government.- 35 -
Although  the  copper  price  has, since  1987,  recovered,  its  rise  may
well  prove  to be temporary.  The  past  experience  of Zambia  suggests  that  it
would  be best  to treat  this  price  rise  as  windfall  gain.  A return  to  a
gradualist  approach  to  policy  reform  - albeit  implemented  more consistently
than  before  - seems,  in early  1989,  still  to hold  the  best  promise  for  future
recovery,  on both  technical  and  pragmatic  grounds.
More generally,  the  Zambian  case  shows  that  serious  labour  market
analysis  should  both  precede  and  be incorporated  in the  design  of
stabilisation  and  adjustment  programmes  if  they  are  to stand  much chance  of
success  in  either  political  or economic  tezus.  The results  of adopting  this
different  approach  would  be to increase  the  time  frame  within  which
stabilisation  is  expected  to  work,  to  put less  reliance  upon  currency  auctions
and  more  upon  a  managed  approach  to  devaluation,  and  to pay  more attention  to
the  dimensions  and  distribution  of transitional  costs.  In  most cases,  the
nature  of the real  wage response  will remain  critical.  But  it  makes  little
sense  to presuppose  that  this  variable  will  be infinitely  pliant  if  cursory
attention  to economic  history  would  demonstrate  - as it does  in Zambia  - that
such  an  assumption  belies  the  facts.- 36  -
FOOTNOTES
1  These  statements  assume  a  population  of 4,830,900  in  1975  and  6,465,100
in  1984 (projected  on the  basis  of information  given  in  Table  1),
together  with levels  of formal  employment,  for  those  years,  indicated  by
Table  4.
2  The  declining  trend  indicated  by Table  4 for  the  years  1964-72
relates  to  non-Africans,  as itdicated  in the  notes  to the  Table.
Although  their  numbers  fell  consistently,  there  was a rising  tide  of
non-Zambian  African  inrAigrants  from  elsewhere  in the  continent.  As
is suggested  by the  data  which  use  a changed  basis  of  classification
from  1973,  it is  believed  that  these  trends  roughly  coincided  in
magnitude,  providing  approximate  stability  in  the  number  of
expatriates  employed.
3  Since,  however,  such  people  remain  non-nationals,  they  do have  the
option  of returning  to their  home  countries.  Emigration,  for  them,
is thus  much  more likely  than  for  most  members  of the  citizen  labour
force.  From  a supply-side  point  of  view,  therefore,  it  would  be
unwise  to  count  automatically  upon  their  continued  presence,
particularly  under  the  recent  circumstances  of sharply  declining
incomes  from  wage  and  salaried  employment.
4  The  survey  covered  approximately  70  per  cent  of  total  formal
employment  in  1983.  Focused,  as  it  was,  on  the  line-of-rail
centres,  a  substantially  higher  proportion  (perhaps  80  per  cent)  of
non-Zambian  employees  was  captured  by the  survey.
5  Daniel  (1979sChapter  7)  provides  interesting  evidence  and  argument
to suggest  that  the  period  of  mining  wage leadership  ended  at a  much
earlier  date  - around  1960.
6  Calculated  from  Heesook  et al.  1986:  Appendix  Table  6.- 37  -
APPENDIX
CoinarLsons  of  earninas  across  Countries
The  data in  Appendix  Table  1  compare  average  monthly  earnings  in  19
countries  for  the  year  1976. Earnings  from  wages  in local  currency  have  been
converted  at the  then  existing  market  or official  rates,  for  agricultural  and
non-agricultural  citizen  workers  separately.  Countries  are  ranked  according
to their  level  of per  capita  GDP iii  the  same  year.
In  using  these  data  it  is  necessary  to  be aware  of the  difficulties
associated  with these  sorts  of comparison.  First,  the  concepts,  scope  and
methods  used in the  compilation  of earnings  data  differ  between  countries.
Such  data  reflect  the  influence  not  only  of  wage rates,  but  also  of hours
worked  and  of  overtime  payments. Thus,  countries  which  collect  data  on
average  monthly  earnings  - as do  many in  our  sample  - will  tend,  ceteris
paribus,  to  produce  higher  earnings  estimates  than  those  which  are  based  upon
daily  or  hourly  wage rates. On the  other  hand,  monthly  earnlngs  data  would
tend  to  produce  lower  eetimates  to the  extent  that  they  are  more  affected  by
loss  of  working  time  through  sickness,  absenteeism  or  part-time  work.
Differential  tax  regimes  would,  of  course,  additionally  affect  inter-country
generalisations  about  income  distribution,  but  this  is  not so important  if one
is interested  mainly  in  the  issue  of comparative  labour  costs.
A more fundamental  problem  is  that  the  comparison  of international
differences  in real  wage incomes  of  workers  should  involve  the  conversion  of
the  data into  a  common  reference  currency  by means  of factors  which  reflect
the  relative  purchasing  power  of the  currencies  concerned. The  calculation  of
such  factors  is  extremely  difficult,  and  can  only  be  properly  done  for
countries  with similar  social  and  economic  characteristics.  They  should
preferably  be based  upon  uniform  enquiries  of purchasing  power  in  each
country,  and  should  be based  upon  earnings  net  of tax. This  information  does
not exist  internationally.  Table  Al relies  upon  earnings  conversions  to  US
dollars  at the  market  or official  exchange  rates  which  held  in 1976.  This
undoubtedly  produces  some  distortions.  To take,  by illustration,  the  examples
of Sri  Lanka  and  Zambia:  part  of the  reason  for  the  large  differences  in
dollar-equivalent  earnings  shown  in  the  table  lies  in the  significantly  higher
domestic  purchasing  power  of the  rupee  compared  to the  [wacha  at then  current
exchange  rates.
Notwithstanding  the  above  problems,  the  data  in the  table  do suggest
that  Zambian  wages  were  very  high in  the  mid  709.  That  appears  to be true
both  absolutely  (in  comparison  to real  wages  paid in  other  countries)  and
relative  to  per  capita  income. These  and  other  implications  are  explored
further  in the  text.Asoendix  Table  1:  International  ComparisOD  of  nthly  Earninas  and  Per  Capita  Incoers.  1 97 6C
COuntry  oCrrency  Ehangb  Non-Agricultural  Sectorr.  Agricultural  Sector  Per  Capita  Ratio  Ratio
Unit  Rate  Earnings,  Earnings,  Earnings,  Earnings,  GNP  Cbl 141  Col (4)
In  local  in  US  in  local  In  US  Us  $  Col 47)  Col (6)
currencyc  DollarsC  Currencyc  DollaraC
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Burundid  Franca  78.7500  5028.00  63.80  3544.00  45.10  120  0.53  1.41
Malawi  WWAch  0.9074  4 4. 9 4e  49.50  10.98  12.10  140  0.35  4.09
Sierra  Leone  Leonev  1.1748  49.15  41.80  - - 200  0.21  -
Sri  Lanka  Rupe  8.8280  311.90  35.30  130.831  14.80  200  0.18  2.39
Kenya  Shillings  8.3100  905.90of  109.00  3l2.90Df  37.70  240  0.45  2.89
Nigeriad  Naire  0.6267  42.70  68.10  34.22  54.60  380  0.18  1.25
Bolivia  Pson  20.0000  1750.000  87.50  - - 390  0.22  -
Hondaras  Lswiras  2.0000  253.48  126.70  - - 390  0.32  -
Philippinead  Paso  7.5100  413.00  55.00  135. 80 f  18.00  410  0.13  3.06
Zia  wewcha  0.7934  131. 000  165.10  50.00  63.00  440  0.38  2.62
Papu  Nem Guinea  Kina  0.8120  144.00  177.00  40.00  49.30  490  0.36  3.59
not  w  Pula  0.8696  86.50  99.47  30.00  34.50  500  0.19  2.88
Korea (Rep  of)  won  484.0000  62362.o00f  128.80  35284.00f  72.90  670  0.19  1.77
Nicaragua  Cordobas  7.0260  974.11  138.60  - - 750  0.18  -
Peru  soles  69.3700  6805.60  98.10  - - 800  0.12  - CO
Cube  Peow  0.8290  143.000  172.50  135.17  163.10  860  0.20  1.06
Algeria  Dinerv  4.3SS5  656.90  150.70  - - 990  0.15  -
Costa  Rica  Colones  8.5700  1487.00  173.50  52 0 . 0 0fh  60.70  1V40  0.17  2.86
Veez4uela  Bolivarea  4.2900  1816.00  423.30  - - 2.-0  0.16  -
* oIes:
a)  In  ome ces,  source  data  refer  to  hourly,  daily  or  weekly  earnings.  The"  have  been  converted  to  anthly  rates,
*wuing  an  eight-hour  day,  and  21.66  days,  or  4.33  weeks  per  working  anth.  Nage-earners  only  except  where  otbhrwise  indicated.
b)  Units  of  national  currency  per  US dollar.  Market  rates  at  end  yer  *re used  wherever  possible.
c)  No non-cash  earnings  received  or  included,  except  where  indlcated.
d)  Data  re for  1975.
*)  Including  salary  earners.
fg  Including  the value  of payments  in  kind.
g)  Plantation  and  fisbing  workers  only.
b)  Minimu  rates.
1)  Plantatlon  workers  onLy.
Data  not  available.
Yearbook  of Labour  Statistics  1980,  IW,  Geneva,  1980,  Tables  17  and  22
gt-tistical  Yearbook  1978,  UN, New  York, 1979,  Table 194
World Dank 1978,  Uorld  Develoiment  Report.  1978,  Waghington,  Table I- 39 -
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